The concept of “crime” belongs to criminal law. However, this does not mean that the legislator uses it exclusively in the content of criminal law provisions. Quite the contrary. This concept appears in legal acts belonging to various branches of law, including civil law. This raises legitimate doubts as to the meaning that should be given to ‘crime’ in the interpretation of the Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure, two key acts of civil law. This issue is complex, as there is no legal definition of “crime” in criminal law, and the meaning given to this concept is closely linked to the principles of criminal liability. Moreover, the acceptance of the criminal law understanding of ‘crime’ has legal consequences in the sphere of civil law, which are difficult to justify and explain from a civil law perspective. This is particularly true given that criminal liability and civil liability differ in nature, purpose and the principles of their application. For this reason, civil case law allows for the possibility of “objectifying a crime”. However, doubts arising from the use of the criminal law concept of “crime” in civil law provisions relate not only to substantive law, but also procedural, and arise both in situations where civil proceedings are bound by the findings of a criminal court as to the fact of committing a crime, and in relation to the need for a civil court to make its own findings as to the criminality of an act, which is relevant from the perspective of the civil case being decided.

The research aims to answer the following questions:

1) Should the concept of “crime”, appearing in criminal and civil law provisions, be understood in the same way?
2) Should the concept of “crime”, appearing in civil law provisions, be given the same meaning as in criminal law?
3) Is it reasonable for civil courts to objectify the concept of “crime”, and if so, should this involve giving the concept an autonomous meaning, or is its essence to take into account only the classification of a prohibited act while maintaining the conditions for attributing civil liability?
4) Does the adoption of a particular understanding of the concept of “crime” appearing in civil law provisions differentiate the situation of civil law entities in terms of the possibility of their being covered by the provisions in question, and if so, in what respect?

The dissertation consists of an introduction, four chapters and a summary.

The introduction defines the scope of the research and outlines the provisions of civil law in which the concept of ‘crime’ appears. The first chapter contains considerations on the meaning of ‘crime’ ascribed to it in criminal law. The second chapter presents how the concept of ‘crime’ appearing in civil law provisions is understood in legal scholarship and case law.

The third chapter focuses on the issue of the binding nature of findings made in criminal proceedings regarding the commission of a crime in civil proceedings. The fourth chapter discusses the doubts and reservations arising from the civil court's independent determination of the criminality of an act, which is relevant in the light of civil law provisions. The work concludes with a summary of the previous considerations. Conclusions and proposals *de lege ferenda* are also presented.

The dissertation primarily employs a research method specific to the field of legal sciences – the dogmatic method. This method allowed for an analysis of legal acts relating to the subject of the research. In addition, studies relating to both civil and criminal law, as well as court rulings, were taken into account. The dissertation also used historical and comparative methods.